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Abstract
By imposing system-observer symmetry on the von Neumann description of mea-
surement, it is shown that the quantum measurement problem is structurally equiv-
alent to a familiar reverse-engineering problem: that of describing the behavior of an
arbitrary physical device as algorithm instantiation. It is suggested that this problem
can at best be given a relational solution.
Keywords: Decoherence; Decomposition; Einselection; Entanglement; Quantum-to-classical
transition; Semantics; Tensor-product structure; Virtual machine
1 Introduction
The usual description of quantum measurement, the one made precise by von Neumann [1]
and included, in one form or another, in virtually every textbook, involves an observer O
who performs two operations on a quantum system S: (1) a “preparation” operation that
is generally only specified by specifying its outcome, a quantum state |Ss〉 of S expressed as
a superposition |Ss〉 =
∑
i λi |si〉 in some complete, orthonormal basis {|si〉} of the Hilbert
space HS of S; and (2) a “measurement” operation that is specified by specifying a Hermi-
tian operator Ms with eigenvalues αi such that for each i, Ms|Ss〉 = αi |si〉 with a classical
probability Pi = |λi|2. As emphasized by Bohr [2] and many others, this usual description
involves a choice on the part of the observer: the choice of which degrees of freedom of S to
measure (e.g. position or momentum), and hence the choice of which basis {|si〉} to employ
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to describeHS. This choice determines, up to practical issues of laboratory implementation,
both the preparation procedure that yields the {|si〉}-specific “ready” state |Ss〉 and the
observable Ms for which the {|si〉} are eigenstates. The nature and implementation of this
choice are generally left unspecified; indeed what “choice” amounts to is typically regarded
as a philosophical or possibly neuropsychological question, not a physical question.
As is well known, the von Neumann description of measurement raises a conceptual problem,
the “measurement problem,” or in more recent language, the problem of the “emergence of
classicality.” This is not a formal problem; “collapse” to a specific eigenstate αi|si〉 is easily
achieved with a projector. It is rather a physical problem: what physically implements the
formal operation represented by Ms? The present paper approaches this problem via the
fundamental symmetry of which Newton’s third law is a special case: once asymmetrical
approximations made for calculational convenience are set aside, any physical interaction
between two physical systems must have equivalent descriptions from either system’s point
of view. The action of O on S represented by Ms must, therefore, also be describable as
an action of S on O, one that produces an outcome state of O characterized by the eigen-
value αi and the classical probability Pi. This outcome state of O corresponds, clearly,
to O “having the information” that S is in the eigenstate |si〉. Treating measurement as
an operation by a quantum system on an observer removes the possibility of appeals to
ill-defined notions of “choice” and offers the possibility of exposing implicit and potentially
non-physical assumptions about “observers.” As discussed below, this approach also clar-
ifies the physical presuppositions of asymmetrical approximations that are typically made
when formally describing measurement, such as the statistical treatment of the environment
in decoherence theory.
The paper begins by assuming that minimal, non-relativistic quantum theory is correct
within its domain, applies universally, and provides a complete description of physical dy-
namics. This fundamental assumption assures that it makes sense to talk about a universal
Hilbert space HU and a universal quantum state |U〉 that evolves according to a universal
Schro¨dinger equation (∂/∂t)|U〉 = −(ı/~)HU|U〉, where HU is a deterministic universal
Hamiltonian. It rules out any objective non-unitary “collapse” of |U〉; it also requires that
observers be treated as physical systems and rules out any non-physical mechanism by
which beliefs of or choices made by observers influence physical dynamics. A category-
theoretic formalism is employed to show that the usual quantum measurement problem can
be described as a failure of commutativity between physical processes on the one hand and
the tensor-product decomposition of HU on the other. Using this same formalism, it is
then shown that quantum measurement is structurally equivalent to the familiar reverse-
engineering process of constructing a formal semantics that interprets the behavior of an
otherwise-uncharacterized physical device as an execution trace of either a classical or a
quantum algorithm. This structural equivalence suggests that “measurement” can be self-
consistently viewed as a purely virtual process implemented by HU. Adopting this view
enables a formal representation of measurement in which physical and virtual processes
commute, and hence a formal resolution of the measurement problem. It highlights the
deep question of how HU physically implements the familiar classical semantics of separa-
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ble “systems,” and suggests that this question can at best be given a relational answer.
2 The measurement problem as a problem of operator
commutativity
Describing a sequence of physical events in terms of system preparation and measurement
requires introducing a tensor-product structure (TPS) on HU that explicitly divides the
physical degrees of freedom of U into (at least) three subsets: a set of degrees of freedom of
the system of interest S, a set of degrees of freedom of the observer O, and a set comprising
all degrees of freedom not assigned to either S or O, which are conventionally considered
to characterize the “environment” (or “shared environment”) E. This environment can be
taken to include any macroscopic apparatus that O employs to investigate S. It is standard
to write this TPS as a simple equality HS ⊗HE ⊗HO = HU. Zurek, for example, adopts
as “axiom(o)” of quantum theory that “the Universe consists of systems” and “a compos-
ite system can be described by a tensor product of the Hilbert spaces of the constituent
systems” ([3] p. 746; see also [4], p. 2; [5], p. 3) in order to justify this practice.
From an information-theoretic perspective, imposing a TPS onHU is an operation, one that
partitions the degrees of freedom of U. Thus while the evolution of U as a whole can be
discussed within the category (H,A) of Hilbert spaces H and Hilbert-space automorphisms
A, the imposition of a TPS requires the richer category (H,A,⊗) that includes Hilbert-space
tensor products as additional morphisms. Let D : (H,A)→ (H,A,⊗) be the decomposition
functor that introduces ⊗ and hence TPSs into (H,A), and let DSO : HU 7→ HS ⊗HE ⊗
HO be a particular decomposition operator acting on the particular Hilbert space HU.
This explicit representation of decomposition allows the explicit statement of an assumed
symmetry of the physical world that is left implicit within the standard formalism: for
any specified S and O, the decomposition mapping DSO = IU, where IU is the Identity
operator on HU. This symmetry, called “decompositional equivalence” in [6, 7, 8], is what
allows HS ⊗ HE ⊗ HO = HU to be written as an identity, and what allows HU to be
written as a sum HU =
∑
ij Hij of Hamiltonians Hij coupling individual degrees of freedom
i and j. It states that decompositions into systems have no effect on the state |U〉 or the
Hamiltonian HU; different decompositions enable different descriptions of the physics of
U, but do not change of the physics of U. The assumption of decompositional equivalence
is clearly essential to the practice of science; without it, alternative descriptions cannot be
regarded as descriptions of the same universe.
Using this explicit representation of decomposition, the usual von Neumann description of
measurement can be represented in diagrammatic form as in Fig. 1. Here the universal
state |U〉 evolves under the action of the universal propagator e−(i/~)HU(t) in an entirely
decomposition-independent way. The decomposition operator DSO acts at the time points
t0, t1 and t2 to construct, at each time point tn, a TPS HS(tn)⊗HE(tn)⊗HO(tn). It is an
assumption, often implicit, of the von Neumann representation of measurement that this
TPS is time-invariant, i.e. that no degrees of freedom are exchanged between partitions
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defined by the TPS; the time labels are kept explicit in Fig. 1 for consistency with later
diagrams. The evolution of the states of this assumed-to-be time-invariant TPS is given by
the standard von Neumann chain. Between t0 and t1, a preparation operation acts on an
unspecified initial state |S(t0 )〉 ⊗ |E(t0 )〉 ⊗ |O(t0 )〉 to yield the prepared state
∑
i λi |si〉 ⊗
|E(t1 )〉⊗ |Os〉, where the notation ‘|Os〉’ is employed to indicate that at t1, the observer O
has the information that the system S has been prepared in the state
∑
i λi|si〉. Between
t1 and t2 the Hermitian operator Ms acts on the prepared system state to yield, with
probability Pi, the eigenstate αi|si〉; the notation ‘|Oi〉’ indicates that at t2, O has the
information that S occupies this eigenstate.
|S(t0 )〉 ⊗ |E(t0 )〉 ⊗ |O(t0 )〉 7→
∑
i λi |si〉 ⊗ |E(t1 )〉 ⊗ |Os〉 7→ αi|si〉 ⊗ |E(t2 )〉 ⊗ |Oi〉
Preparation MsHS(t0 )⊗HE(t0 )⊗HO(t0 ) ✲ HS(t1 )⊗HE(t1 )⊗HO(t1 ) ✲ HS(t2 )⊗HE(t2 )⊗HO(t2 )
DSO(t0 )
✻ DSO(t1 )
✻ DSO(t2 )
✻
e−(i/~)HU(t)|t0→t1HU ✲ HU ✲ HU
e−(i/~)HU(t)|t1→t2
Fig. 1: The usual von Neumann representation of measurement, with the decomposition
mapping DSO made explicit. The mapping Ms is a Hermitian observable associated with
the basis {|si〉}. The upper row of mappings is the familiar von Neumann chain.
The usual quantum measurement problem can be stated succinctly in this representa-
tion: the diagram shown in Fig. 1 does not commute, i.e. DSO(t2 ) ◦ e−(i/~)HU(t)|t0→t2 6=
Ms ◦ Preparation ◦ DSO(t0 ) where ‘◦’ indicates composition of mappings and is read “fol-
lowing.” In particular, αi|si〉 is a “collapsed” eigenstate of Ms, while nothing has collapsed
in |U〉. This failure of commutativity makes it impossible to say in a well-defined way
how the evolution of |U〉 physically implements the measurement process, as it must do if
quantum theory is to be complete.
As is well known, different physical interpretations of quantum theory deal with this fail-
ure of commutativity in different ways. Non-ontic approaches, including the Copenhagen
interpretation if it is viewed purely epistemically, reject the identification of the states on
the top line as physical states, treating them instead as informational states in the mind
of the observer (e.g. [9, 10, 11]). Such approaches to date make no attempt to explain
how information about physical states gets into the mind of the observer. Fuchs [10], for
example, explicitly rejects this question as outside the domain of the theory, thus implicitly
rejecting either the physicality of observers or the universality of quantum theory as a de-
scription of physical processes. The Everett (e.g. [12, 13, 14]) and decoherent histories (e.g.
[15, 16]) approaches expand the top line into the set of all possible mutually-decoherent top
lines (i.e. for all possible values of i), and treat all as equally physical and hence equally
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ontic. Classicality is taken to be imposed by decoherence; both system and observer [14]
or the observer’s mind [17] are taken to exist in multiple “copies” on different, mutually-
inaccessible classical branches or histories. In order for these multiple copies to be identified
as physical and hence quantum systems, i.e. as the TPS components S or O in Fig. 1, the
TPS HS ⊗ HE ⊗ HO must be assumed to be invariant across branches or histories. The
environment as witness formulation of decoherence theory [18, 19] replaces the top line with
separate local system-environment and environment-observer interactions, and argues that
observers can only extract from their local environments information about eigenstates of
the local system-environment interaction. As these eigenstates are selected and redundantly
encoded by the environment independently of the observer, the local environment-observer
interaction and the observer’s information are both effectively classical regardless of their
physical implementation. Whether effective classicality is attributed within these various
approaches to records stored in the memories of automated systems such as laboratory com-
puters (i.e. in the environment E) as well as to records stored in the memories of human
or other animate observers is rarely discussed explicitly and seldom made clear. Recent
surveys of attendees at quantum foundations conferences indicate little consensus on the
most basic questions regarding the physical interpretation of quantum theory [20, 21]; such
fundamental disagreement about the physical interpretation of the theory constitutes prima
facie evidence that the meanings of the formal expressions employed by the theory require
clarification.
One relevant issue that standard interpretations of quantum theory, and hence standard
explanations of the emergence of classicality universally neglect is that the decomposition
operator DSO by itself introduces classicality into Fig. 1, quite independently of assump-
tions or interpretations regarding collapse or decoherence. By imposing a TPS on HU, DSO
allocates, either explicitly or implicitly, every degree of freedom of HU to one component or
another of the TPS. In some cases, this allocation of degrees of freedom is physically para-
doxical, as for example when a collection of microscopic degrees of freedom is considered
to be part of the environment of a macroscopic degree of freedom - such as the center-
of-mass position of a bulk material object - that exists only as a notional mathematical
consequence of its microscopic “environment” (e.g. [22] p. 354 ff ). Even in cases that
are not paradoxical in this way, however, how the components of a TPS evolving under
the action of e−(i/~)HU(t) relate to our ordinary sense of an “object” or its “environment”
is far from clear. For example, consider an Ag ion passing through a Stern-Gerlach appa-
ratus. From the simplified formal perspective of a typical textbook, the ion’s spin is the
system of interest S; heating the ion in the ion source prepares (for example) the state
|Sz 〉 = (1/
√
(2)(| ↑〉 + | ↓〉). From a physical perspective, however, it is the ion itself that
is heated and emitted from the source and that passes through the apparatus, and it is the
ion’s position that is eventually detected, via a physical interaction with its electric charge.
Hence physically, it is the ion itself, as a package including all of its degrees of freedom, that
DSO allocates to the TPS component S. Consistent with von Neuman’s representation, no
one considers the ion being “part of S” as one possible value of a physical (i.e. quantum)
degree of freedom; no one writes |ψion〉 = (1/
√
2)(|part of S〉 + |part of E〉). All acknowl-
edge, however, that prior to the experiment the ion was part of the ion source, and that by
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the end of the measurement the ion has been irreversibly absorbed by the detector; in both
of these conditions it is “part of E” in every meaningful sense. This is clearly problematic,
as it implies that HE(t0 ) 6= HE(t1 ) 6= HE(t2 ), and in particular that both Preparation and
Ms alter the TPS of HU. Any such change violates von Neumann’s assumption of a fixed,
time-invariant decomposition, and hence threatens the self-consistency of the von Neu-
mann representation of measurement. On a deeper level, the conceptual conflict between
the mathematical construction of a fixed TPS and the experimental generation of “systems”
from the bulk properties of the world suggests that the physical separability implied by a
TPS may be a poorly-understood approximation even under the best of circumstances. It
suggests, in other words, that the contextuality demonstrated by the Kochen-Specker and
similar theorems [23, 24] may a more ubiquitous feature of physical reality than is generally
appreciated.
Lack of clarity about what decomposition of HU into a TPS means physically is especially
profound in formal approaches that appeal to environmental decoherence during the mea-
surement process. Decoherence depends for its definition on a TPS; it depends for physical
effectiveness on the assumption that E is large with respect to both S and O, an assump-
tion that is often rendered epistemically as an assumption that O does not (or cannot)
measure the quantum state |E〉, and rendered formally by treating E as a heat bath. If
the system S must be produced from E, however, not just observation but specific, state-
dependent manipulation of E by O is required. Such observations and manipulations can
be dismissed as “classical,” but not in a theoretical context intended to explain the “emer-
gence of classicality” via decoherence. The mechanism of decoherence depends, moreover,
on system-environment entanglement and hence on the progressive blurring of any physical
distinction between “system” and “environment.” Indeed if decompositional equivalence
is true in HU, as it must be for quantum theory to be even approximately accurate, the
operation DSO can have no physical consequences; in this case what it means to assume
separability and call |S〉, |E〉 or |O〉 physical states is itself unclear. Reversing the usual
perspective on measurement and asking how an observer, as opposed to an observed system,
gets into his, her or its post-measurement state serves to isolate and emphasize the role of
such decomposition-imposed classicality in creating the measurement problem.
3 Measurement as an action of a system on an ob-
server
If one follows Landauer’s dictum that all information is at all times physically encoded
[25], then the states |Os〉 and |Oi〉 must be physical states of the observer that encode the
information “the system is now in the state
∑
i λi|si〉” and “the system is now in the state
αi|si〉” respectively. Although these items of information describe quantum states of S, they
are themselves classical: they may be expressed using finite strings of fixed symbols, and
written on a classical memory such as a printed page. It is, therefore, generally supposed
that they are encoded by classical states of the observer, i.e. that |Os〉 and |Oi〉 are classical
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- or “effectively classical” - physical states. The point of both the environment as witness
formulation of decoherence and the “quantum consciousness” theories of von Neumann [1],
Wigner [26], or more recently Hameroff and Penrose [27] or Stapp [28] is to show how such
physical states of the observer could become classical.
Before asking how |Os〉 and |Oi〉 could be or even appear to be classical states, however,
it is reasonable to ask how O gets into either of these states. The answer can only be:
by physically interacting with S, or in the environment as witness formulation, with E.
As a first step toward describing this interaction, let us define a mapping R : A→ A on
automorphisms A of U such that R(Ms) is an Hermitian operator representing the physical
action of S on O. The measurement process can then be described as in Fig. 2, where as
in Fig. 1 the top line represents the von Neumann chain. Here the notation ‘|So〉’ indicates
the state of S after “preparing” O in the basis {|oi〉} and the notation ‘|Si〉’ indicates the
state of S after interacting with O in a way that places O in the eigenstate αi|oi〉 with
probability Pi.
|S(t0 )〉 ⊗ |E(t0 )〉 ⊗ |O(t0 )〉 7→ |So〉 ⊗ |E(t1 )〉 ⊗
∑
i λi |oi〉 7→ |Si〉 ⊗ |E(t2 )〉 ⊗ αi |oi〉
R(Preparation) R(Ms)HS(t0 )⊗HE(t0 )⊗HO(t0 ) ✲ HS(t1 )⊗HE(t1 )⊗HO(t1 ) ✲ HS(t2 )⊗HE(t2 )⊗HO(t2 )
DSO(t0 )
✻ DSO(t1 )
✻ DSO(t2 )
✻
e−(i/~)HU(t)|t0→t1HU ✲ HU ✲ HU
e−(i/~)HU(t)|t1→t2
Fig. 2: Measurement represented as an action of the system S on the observer O.
The operator R transforms Ms into the action R(Ms) on |S〉 ⊗ |O〉. The upper row
of mappings is the transformed von Neumann chain.
The reversed von Neumann chain shown in Fig. 2 allows the question of the role of decoher-
ence in measurement to be asked independently of any implicit and potentially non-physical
assumptions about observers. In Fig. 2, decoherence does not act on S to einselect an eigen-
state; it acts on O, and einselects eigenstates in the {|oi〉} basis. These eigenstates of O
must, therefore, be eigenstates of the S-O interaction, or in the environment as witness
formulation, of the E-O interaction. This interaction is the interaction that physically im-
plements R(Ms). Hence in the reversed von Neumann chain, measurement and einselection
are the same physical action on the observer. Einselection and hence decoherence cannot,
therefore, play any role in the measurement process that is not already played by R(Ms); in
particular, neither decoherence nor einselection can be prerequisites of R(Ms), as they are
in standard presentations of the environment as witness formulation. Decoherence cannot,
in other words, create either physical or effective classicality that is not already created by
the reversed “measurement” operation performed by S, or in the environment as witness
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formulation by E, on the observer O.
To emphasize this point, let us adopt the perspective of the environoment as witness, with
its notion that the observer O is, as in the formalism of [18, 19], restricted to a “fragment”
F of the environment E that is sufficiently distant from the system S that the local E-
O interaction - i.e. the F-O interaction - can be taken to have no effect on the S-E
interaction and hence no effect on the state of S. In this situation, O interacts with and
extracts information from encodings of the distant system state |S〉 in the local state |F〉 of
the environmental fragment F; the local encoding of the position of a distant system by the
ambient visual-spectrum photon field near the observer is the canonical example [29, 30].
From the present, reversed perspective, the action of F on O implements this information
transfer. One can now ask: how does the action of F on O transfer information about
the distant system S, and in particular, how does this action result in O occupying αi|oi〉
with probability Pi? What is it about |F〉 that makes it a specific encoding of |S〉? In a
universe satisfying decompositional equivalence, this question clearly can have no answer.
Nothing makes |F〉 specific to |S〉; indeed |F〉 equally encodes the states of every collection
of degrees of freedom outside of F [7, 8]. The action of F on O cannot, therefore, place O
in the S-specific state αi|oi〉. If O is restricted to a distant environmental fragment F, Fig.
2 not only fails to commute; the operator R(Ms) becomes physically undefined.
While this analysis of the reversed measurement situation illustrated by Fig. 2 shows
that decoherence cannot explain the effective classicality of measurement outcomes, it fails
to show what does explain it. Like Fig. 1, Fig. 2 does not commute; nothing in |U〉
corresponds to the “collapsed” eigenstate αi|oi〉. The primary problem with Fig. 2, however,
is that the physical basis states |oi〉 remain uncharacterized. All that is known is the classical
information that these basis states encode: |oi〉 encodes the classical information ‘S is in
|si〉’. Any reflection on the physical structure of human observers - or even of general-
purpose computers employed as data recorders - moreover suggests that the physical states
|oi〉 may differ almost arbitrarily between observers. If this is the case, the operator R(Ms)
once again becomes physically undefined; S must act in different ways on different observers
to produce the same encoded information as an outcome. If R(Ms) is not well-defined
across multiple observers, however, the unreversed measurement operator Ms cannot be
well-defined across multiple observers either. We write down formal expressions such as
‘pˆ = −ı~(∂/∂x)’ that appear to be well-defined, but these expressions clearly do not describe
the physical interaction of a human being (or a physically-implemented computer) and a
physical system. Indeed, the formal expression ‘pˆ = −ı~(∂/∂x)’ does not even reference
the Hilbert space over which it is meant to be defined; it is simply assumed in ordinary
practice that pˆ = −ı~(∂/∂x) acts on whatever Hilbert space is of interest. We have no idea,
in other words, how pˆ = −ı~(∂/∂x) is implemented by HU, or for that matter by the local
interaction HS-O between any designated S and O.
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4 Representing encoded classical information explic-
itly
What is known about the physical state αi|oi〉 of the observer is that it represents the
classical information ‘S is in |si〉’ and has a classical probability Pi as an outcome of the
to-be-defined physical action R(Ms). Abstract “states” comprising encoded classical infor-
mation are familiar entities: states of classical computational processes are such things. Let
us define a functor V : (H,A)→ (M,։) that maps the category (H,A) of Hilbert spaces
and Hilbert-space automorphisms to the category (M,։) of abstract virtual machines
[31, 32, 33] and virtual-machine state transitions. Let VO(tn) be an instance of V acting on
the particular Hilbert space HO(tn) to generate the virtual-machine state implemented by
O at tn. The diagram shown in Fig. 2 can then be extended to Fig. 3, using the notation
‘[X ]’ to indicate the virtual machine state encoding the classical information ‘X ’.
VO(Preparation) VO(Ms)
[S] [S prepared in {|si〉}] [S in αi|si〉]
VO(t0 )
✻ VO(t1 )
✻ VO(t2 )
✻
|S(t0 )〉 ⊗ |E(t0 )〉 ⊗ |O(t0 )〉 7→ |So〉 ⊗ |E(t1 )〉 ⊗
∑
i λi |oi〉 7→ |Si〉 ⊗ |E(t2 )〉 ⊗ αi |oi〉
R(Preparation) R(Ms)HS(t0 )⊗HE(t0 )⊗HO(t0 ) ✲ HS(t1 )⊗HE(t1 )⊗HO(t1 ) ✲ HS(t2 )⊗HE(t2 )⊗HO(t2 )
DSO(t0 )
✻ DSO(t1 )
✻ DSO(t2 )
✻
e−(i/~)HU(t)|t0→t1HU ✲ HU ✲ HU
e−(i/~)HU(t)|t1→t2
Fig. 3: Explicit representation of the information about S encoded by O. The operator
VO maps physical states of O to the information that they encode. The initial state
|O(t0 )〉 encodes the classical information ‘[S]’ specified by the decomposition DSO.
The classical information [S] imposed on the physics by the decomposition DSO is repre-
sented explicitly in Fig. 3. This diagram therefore commutes: [S in αi|si〉] is not a physical
state, so VO(t2 )◦DSO(t2 )◦e−(i/~)HU(t)|t0→t2 = VO(Ms)◦VO(Preparation)◦VO(t0 )◦DSO(t0 )
introduces no paradoxical physical “collapse.” Explicitly distinguishing quantum states as
physical entities from the classical information that they encode thus provides a formal
resolution of the measurement problem as it is standardly conceived. It also resolves the
problem posed by the apparent time-dependence of the TPS HS ⊗ HE ⊗ HO under ordi-
nary laboratory circumstances by recognizing that relevant classical information may be
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encoded by different partitions of HU at different times. Because the partitions imposed
by DSO need not be regarded as physical partitions in this representation, no assumptions
of physical separability are implied.
The formal resolution of the measurement problem enabled by an explicit representation
of encoded information is, moreover, a familiar one; it is identical to the formal resolution
of the problem of characterizing physical behavior as computation that is reflected in the
Church-Turing thesis. Consider, for example, the characterization of the physical behavior
of a laptop computer as an execution trace of some algorithmA. As a physical device C, the
laptop computer is a quantum system like any other. If its interaction with the environment
(and hence with a user) is neglected, it can be described by a state |C〉 in a Hilbert space
HC that evolves under the action of some self-propagator e−(i/~)HC(t); this is precisely the
Hamiltonian oracle view of computation [34]. Describing the laptop as a classical computer
requires imposing a decomposition DC on HC that identifies particular physical degrees of
freedom, e.g. particular voltage levels, with particular spatially-bounded and temporally-
stable macroscopic or at least mesoscopic components, e.g. particular transistors. Multiple
such decompositions are possible, and they have no effect on HC, i.e. decompositional
equivalence is satisfied. The interpretation of the behavior of C as an execution trace of
an algorithm A acting on a defined classical data structure D is then accomplished via a
diagram such as Fig. 4, which for simplicity illustrates only three time steps, and treats
the generally multi-layered semantic mapping from decompositionally-specified “hardware”
states to abstract states of D as a single semantics VC. This diagram is clearly structurally
equivalent to Fig. 3, and it commutes without the introduction of any physical paradox.
A1 A2
[D1 ] [D2 ] [D3 ]
VC(t0 )
✻ VC(t1 ) ✻ VC(t2 )
✻
|T1(t0 )〉 ⊗ |T2(t0 )〉 ⊗ ...⊗ |TN(t0 )〉 7→
|T1(t1 )〉⊗
7→ |T1(t2 )〉 ⊗ |T2(t2 )〉 ⊗ ...⊗ |TN(t2 )〉
{
|T2(t1 )〉 ⊗ ...
⊗|TN(t1 )〉
}
HT1 ⊗HT2 ⊗ ...⊗HTN(t0 )−→HT1 ⊗HT2 ⊗ ...⊗HTN(t1 )−→HT1 ⊗HT2 ⊗ ...⊗HTN(t2 )
DC(t0 )
✻ DC(t1 )
✻ DC(t2 )
✻
e−(i/~)HC(t)|t0→t1HC ✲ HC ✲ HC
e−(i/~)HC(t)|t1→t2
Fig. 4: Interpretation of the behavior of a physical device C as an execution trace of
an algorithm A on a classical data structure D. The decomposition operator DC that
defines the “hardware” states |T1〉 ... |TN〉 has no effect on the physical dynamics HC.
Time dependence of TPS components has been abbreviated to preserve the layout.
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It is important to emphasize that Fig. 3 does not reflect a non-ontic view of quantum states,
just as Fig. 4 does not reflect a non-ontic view of laptop computers. Indeed it reflects pre-
cisely the opposite view: quantum states are physical states, but all classical states are
virtual. This conclusion follows directly from decompositional equivalence. Because de-
compositions of HU into TPSs have no effects on HU, they can be interchanged without
changing anything physical. The category (H,A,⊗) can, therefore, have no physical mean-
ing beyond (H,A); the tensor-product operator ⊗ has significance for the semantics, but
no physical significance. The decomposition operator DSO and the problematic “states”
that it generates can, therefore, be dropped from Fig. 3 altogether to produce the much
simpler representation shown in Fig. 5, in which the semantics VO is taken to act directly
on |U〉.
VO(Preparation) VO(Ms)
[S] [S prepared in {|si〉}] [S in αi|si〉]
VO(t0 )
✻ VO(t1 )
✻ VO(t2 )
✻
e−(i/~)HU(t)|t0→t1|U(t0 )〉 ✲ |U(t1 )〉 ✲ |U(t2 )〉
e−(i/~)HU(t)|t1→t2
Fig. 5: Simplification of Fig. 3 recognizing that decomposition into a TPS has no
physical consequences and hence that the semantics VO can be regarded as acting
directly on the physical state |U〉.
The diagram shown in Fig. 5 cleanly raises the question at the core of the quantum mea-
surement problem: what is the physical implementation of the semantics VO? What does
it mean to say that one collection of degrees of freedom of U encodes classical information
about another collection of degrees of freedom of U, and how can such an encoding, once
established, remain stable over time? As suggested in [8], the only available answer to the
former question appears to be entanglement, a means of generating recordable classical
correlations that is itself decomposition- and observable-dependent [35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40]
and hence non-objective [41]. The answer to the latter would appear to depend entirely on
the details of HU, details that at least appear not to generalize across encodings.
5 Conclusion
Viewing measurement as a physical process in which the system of interest acts on the
observer serves to emphasize a conclusion derivable from decompositional equivalence alone:
if minimal quantum theory is assumed to be correct, classical states can only consistently
be described as virtual. Every classical “it,” in other words, is a “bit” and nothing more.
11
Recognizing this provides a formal resolution to the measurement problem as standardly
formulated, one that is familiar from the classical semantics of programming languages. This
formal resolution raises the deeper question of how HU physically implements a classical
semantics. The demonstrated decomposition-dependence of entanglement suggests that
this question has at best a relational answer.
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